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Abstract
A Contingent Convertible (CoCo) bond is an instrument that converts into equity or
suers a write-down when the issuing bank is in nancial distress. In practice, a trigger
event of CoCo takes place when the capital ratio of the bank falls to the pre-dened
level or when the national authority declares a trigger at its discretion. The aims of this
study are to model CoCos having such triggers and to nd eective regulatory policies
to handle them. A model for banks issuing CoCos is built within the framework of a
structural-default approach. The trigger mechanisms are expressed in a rst passage
time model and in a stochastic intensity model. CoCo investors are also included in
our model as CoCos are designed to enhance the bank's resilience while shifting its
risks to the investors. In the numerical example, we show that eective regulatory
policy, which is intended to mitigate both banks' and investors' default risks, changes
according to the correlation between banks and investors and the impact of the trigger
event on the bank asset value process.
Keywords: Contingent convertible, structural approach, accounting trigger, regula-
tory trigger, systemic risk, regulatory policy
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A Contingent Convertible (CoCo) is a new type of nancial instrument that came
along with a series of regulatory reforms initiated after the global nancial crisis. A
CoCo automatically converts into equity or suers a write-down when a bank has
faced a nancial diculty. Unlike other major nancial instruments, the design of
CoCo heavily depends on regulator's intention. Thus, regulator's behavior is a key
factor that should be taken into account when studying this instrument. Before going
into details of a CoCo, rst we explain the regulatory background that brought about
CoCos to appear in the nancial market.
1.1 Background
Since the global nancial crisis, which began in 2007, one of the agenda for nancial
regulators has been how to build a resilient nancial system. To date, various regula-
tions have been proposed and implemented in this area at both global and jurisdictional
levels.
The most fundamental piece of the regulatory reform has been a review of the
Basel regulatory framework. The Basel framework provides a global standard with
regard to bank capital regulation. It lays out a minimum requirement for bank's
capital ratio to ensure that a bank has enough capital to be regarded as solvent. The
framework was rst agreed in July 1988 under the leadership of the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) { an international organization made up of banking
supervisors. Since then, a number of improvements have been made in accordance with
the development of nancial markets. However, the global nancial crisis revealed that
the former framework, so called Basel II, was insucient to address risks which was
said to be the root cause of the crisis, such as liquidity risks and o-balance sheet
nancing. In addition, criticism has been made on massive bail-outs employed in
the course of restructuring of large banks. This, so called \too-big-to-fail" problem,
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highlighted the importance of enhanced capital regulations on systemically important
nancial institutions (SIFIs).
The new framework, called Basel III, intends to address these shortcomings. The
Basel III regulations had initially been agreed upon in July 2011 and were nalized
in December 2017. Besides adding new regulations to counter with the shortcomings,
regulators discussed enhancement of existing capital requirements. Compared to the
former framework, the new Basel III packages require banks, especially SIFIs, to hold
higher quality of capital, i.e., loss-absorbing capacity, to enable recovery and resolu-
tion without using taxpayers' money. Basically, higher loss-absorbing capacity can be
attained by issuing more common stocks or by gaining more prots. However, without
a surprise, it is quite costly for banks to raise additional equity or realize prots in a
severe market condition. Regulators searched for other tools that enable recapitaliza-
tion of a bank in the course of crisis. To this end, a CoCo was designed, i.e., a CoCo
is cheaper tool for a bank to issue and is loss-absorbable amid nancial distress.
1.2 What is CoCo
So far, a clear-cut and uniform denition for a CoCo has not been developed. This
paper denes a CoCo as an instrument that converts into equity or suers a write-
down on a going-concern basis when a pre-dened trigger conditions are met.1 The
term \going-concern" is explained in the later section. Accordingly, a CoCo has both
bond and equity features. At rst, a CoCo pays periodical coupons just like a normal
bond. However, as soon as pre-dened trigger conditions are met, it automatically
absorb losses by equity-conversion or write-down of its face value.
Three players are involved in the CoCo market { a bank, an investor and a regulator.
A bank issues a CoCo in order to adhere to the capital regulation. At the trigger
moment, the bank's capital ratio increases by virtue of loss absorption of the CoCo.
An investor buys a CoCo as it is often an attractive instrument with a high coupon rate,
but may suer a loss when the CoCo is triggered. A regulator engages in designing
of a CoCo by providing guidelines for banks and sometimes for investors. Another
important engagement that can be done by the regulator is to determine when to trigger
CoCos { so-called \regulatory trigger" { which is described in the later subsection.
As outlined above, there are two dening features for a CoCo: (1) a loss-absorption
mechanism and (2) a trigger mechanism.
1Some exclude write-down type instruments from the coverage of CoCo. On the other hand, some
do not use the term \CoCo" to name an instrument that has the same features as the CoCo discussed
in this paper.
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1.2.1 Loss-Absorption Mechanism
When a CoCo is triggered, the CoCo absorbs losses either by equity conversion or
write-down of the principal.
Equity Conversion
A CoCo investor receives a certain number of shares pursuant to the face value it has.
In other words, the CoCo investor pays a certain price, namely the conversion price,
to purchase the number of shares. In many cases, the conversion price is oered by the
bank at its initial issuance. Some CoCos have a xed conversion price, for example,
the conversion price equals to the share price at the issue date of the CoCo. Other
CoCos have a oating conversion price such as the conversion price set equal to the
share price at the trigger date.
At the trigger moment, stock dilution may occur depending on the conversion price.
For current shareholders, a higher conversion price would be preferable as smaller
number of new shares is generated at the conversion. Some banks oer a oored
conversion price to avoid excessive dilution to take place at the trigger moment.
Write-down
In some circumstances, a write-down may be a preferred choice to enable loss absorp-
tion. For instance, if we think of a bank who issues non-listed shares, it is dicult to
dene conditions with regard to equity conversion including the conversion price.
Percentage of the haircut, or the write-down ratio, can either be xed or oating.
In xed cases, some CoCos may suer a full write-down at the trigger moment, while
others may be partial. In oating cases, a write-down ratio is determined depending
on how severe the nancial condition is at the trigger moment. For example, some
CoCos are designed to suer a write-down to the extent that is necessary to recover
the minimum capital ratio.
1.2.2 Trigger Mechanism
According to De Spegeleer and Schoutens (2012), three types of triggers can be consid-
ered: (1) market trigger, (2) accounting trigger and (3) regulatory trigger. A CoCo can
have one or more triggers and its trigger mechanism is usually dened in the contract
document.
Market Trigger
A trigger event is expected to happen when the issuer is in nancial distress. Thus,
when designing a trigger mechanism, it is natural to think of using some indicators
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related to the bank's solvency and dene: \when this indicator reaches an insolvency
threshold, the CoCo is triggered." A market observable number such as a share price
or a CDS spread can be a candidate for such an indicator since they are considered
forward-looking data which reect issuer's future risk. However, a market-trigger CoCo
may be vulnerable as the trigger timing can be intentionally changed by market ma-
nipulation.
Accounting Trigger
Instead of market-based numbers, an accounting ratio can also be used as an indicator
that reects issuer's solvency. Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) ratio dened in the Basel
III framework is an example for such an indicator. By using such regulatory capital
ratio, a CoCo can be designed consistently with the existing regulatory framework;
however, we should be aware that the ratio is not always accessible { they are calculated
periodically with some delay. In addition, from a CoCo investor's point of view, the
ratio might not be transparent as the ratio-calculation method is not disclosed to public
in detail.
Regulatory Trigger
This trigger, sometimes called as non-viability trigger or point-of-non-viability (PONV)
trigger, takes a dierent approach from the above-mentioned triggers. If a CoCo has
a regulatory trigger, a regulator responsible for the oversight of the CoCo issuer has
discretion over when to trigger the CoCo. That means, regulators may exercise the
right to trigger CoCos when they conclude that it is necessary to do so in order to
maintain resilient nancial system.
While some argue that the existence of this trigger reduces transparency of the
trigger mechanism, recently issued CoCos tend to have a regulatory trigger to enable
exible capital recovery led by authorities.
1.3 CoCos in Real Markets
The rst CoCo was issued by Lloyds Banking Group in December 2009. Only one
bank, the Rabobank in the Netherlands, followed Lloyds and issued CoCos in 2010.
CoCo market expanded after the publication of the Basel III documents and other
announcements made by national authorities.2 Issuance of CoCo has peaked in 2014
and the cumulative amount of CoCo issuance has reached more than $350 billion as of
2For example, the European Banking Authority provided a term sheet and the Oce of the Super-
intendent of Financial Institutions Canada published guidelines with respect to the design of CoCos
in 2011.
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Figure 1.1: Cumulative Amount of CoCo Issuance
The data show the cumulative amount of issuance of instruments which are labeled as \Contingent
Convertible" in Bloomberg. Jurisdictional classication is applied based on the bond domicile (GB:
the United Kingdom except the British Overseas Territories (e.g., Cayman Islands), CH: Switzerland,
FR: France, DE: Germany, ES: Spain, NL: the Netherlands, CN: the People's Republic of China).
Source: Bloomberg.
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2017 Q3. Many CoCos have their domiciles in European countries such as the United
Kingdom, Switzerland and Germany. CoCo issuance by Chinese banks has also been
increasing.
Table 1.1 shows some examples of CoCos in real markets. According to Avdjiev et
al. (2017), equity-conversion type CoCos were dominant in early years, but write-down
type CoCos have become majority recently.
Compared to other major nancial instruments, the size of CoCo market is still
small. However, the term CoCo was widely noticed in early 2016, when a well-known
large banking group in Europe, who had issued CoCos, revealed a huge amount of loss
in its statement. As seen in Figure 1.2, the CoCo market experienced a sort of \crush"
at that time. People worried whether the bank had enough strength to aord high-
yield CoCos and questioned whether the risk of CoCos, including ones issued by other
banks, had been evaluated appropriately. Unfortunately, it may be quite challenging
to nd a convincing answer to this question since no CoCo has experienced a trigger as
of today. However, recent growth in CoCo markets and the realized crush emphasize
the importance of market participants, as well as regulators, to properly understand
and address risks arising from CoCos.
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Table 1.1: CoCo examples
(a) Equity Conversion
Lloyds Credit Suisse HSBC
Issue Size $7bn (32 series) $2 bn $2.25 bn
Issue Date December 1, 2009 February 24, 2011 March 24, 2015
Maturity 10-20 years 30 years perpetual
Coupon 6.385-16.125% 7.875% 6.375%
Callable None Yes Yes
Conversion Price xed oored xed
Accounting Trigger 5% Core Tier 1 (Basel II) 7% CET 1 7% CET 1
Regulatory Trigger None Yes Yes
(b) Write-down
Rabobank Deutsche Bank Mitsubishi UFJ FG
Issue Size e1.25 bn e17.5 bn Y=10bn
Issue Date March 12, 2010 May 27, 2014 May 23, 2015
Maturity 10 years perpetual perpetual
Coupon 6.875% 6.000% 2.700%
Callable None Yes Yes
Write-down ratio partial (75%) Equal to the amount Full or partial depending
required to recover on the condition at the
minimum CET1 ratio trigger
Accounting Trigger 5% CET 1 5.125% CET 1 5.125% CET 1
Regulatory Trigger None Yes Yes
Source: De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2012), Prospectus
1.4 CoCos and Regulation
Owing to the loss-absorption mechanism it has, a CoCo is regarded as regulatory
capital. Regulatory capital dened in the Basel III framework consists of multiple
categories { CET 1, Additional Tier 1, Tier 2 and other buers. To be brief, Tier 1
and Tier 2 capitals are considered \going-concern" and \gone-concern," respectively.
In the regulatory context, the term going-concern is often used to emphasize that
an instrument is expected to absorb losses in order to continue business operation. On
the other hand, there exists a similar but dierent, so called gone-concern instruments,
which are designed to absorb losses upon entry into resolution. This thesis deals with
a going-concern type CoCo.3 In other words, the trigger level is set equal to or higher
3The Financial Stability Board (2011) requires a regulator to have powers to bail-in an un-triggered
CoCo upon entry into resolution. Although we focus on a going-concern feature of a CoCo, in a
nutshell, sooner or later, a CoCo is expected to function as a loss-absorbing instrument.
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Figure 1.2: Markit iBoxx USD Contingent Convertible Liquid Developed Markets AT1 In-
dex
The index has been calculated daily and rebalanced monthly since December 31, 2013. It is composed
of contingent convertibles which are eligible as Additional Tier 1 under the Basel III regulation. As
of December 2017, 46 CoCos issued by 21 banking groups are included. Source: Bloomberg, Markit.
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than the regulatory minimum to ensure business continuity.
Taking into account that a CoCo is a going-concern instrument, it could belong
to Tier 1 capital, but it is not always the case. According to the Basel documents,
requirements to be counted as Additional Tier 1 include without limitation:
 The issuer has full discretion over payment of a coupon or a dividend.
 The instrument has perpetual maturity and the issuer does not have an incentive
to redeem early, including step-up in coupons.
 The instrument could be callable but requires national authority's approval in
advance to exercise the call.
If a CoCo satises all the requirements, then it can be classied as Additional Tier 1
capital.4 If otherwise, it is labeled as Tier 2 capital.
4Only \pure" capital, which is categorized as \capital" in accounting statements, e.g., common
equity and undistributed prots, can be labeled as CET 1 capital. Thus, a CoCo is not a CET 1
instrument.
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1.5 Literature
The idea of CoCo was introduced by academic studies such as Flannery (2015), Due
(2009) and the Squam Lake Working Group5 (2009). Regulators such as Bernanke
(2009), Dudley (2009) and Haldane (2011) also endorsed to study CoCos by stating that
contingent capital would be an option to enhance capital regulation. Since then, there
have been many studies on CoCos, especially on valuation using diverse approaches.
Some build their models within the framework of a structural approach, which
models bank's balance-sheet dynamics and is attributed to Merton (1974). Glasserman
and Nouri (2012) derive a closed-form solution for CoCos with a capital-ratio trigger by
modeling the bank's asset value process as a geometric Brownian motion. Buergi (2013)
proposes a method to price Tier 1 ratio based CoCos by assuming a linear relationship
between Tier 1 ratio and disclosed capital ratio. Albul, Jaee, and Tchistyi (2015)
apply Leland (1994) to nd an optimal capital structure of a bank issuing CoCo.
De Spiegeleer and Schoutens (2012) propose a credit derivatives approach and an
equity derivatives approach to price a CoCo. The former is a straightforward approach
that applies a reduced-form model to express the trigger intensity, similarly to the
default intensity which is often handled in pricing of credit derivatives. The latter
attempts to price a CoCo by using existing barrier-option pricing methods to evaluate
cashow streams that is unique to a CoCo { equity purchase at the trigger and cancel-
lation of coupon payments after the trigger. Closed-form solutions are available in both
approaches since they consider a stock price, which follows the simple Black-Scholes
model, as the trigger indicator.
Chung and Kwok (2015) include a regulatory trigger into their scope. They consider
a joint process of stock price and capital ratio, and then apply the structural approach
to express an accounting trigger and the reduced-form approach to a regulatory trigger.
Although various models are proposed to evaluate CoCos, there seems to be a
mismatch between academic CoCos and actual CoCos from two aspects. First, many
studies deal with a single-trigger CoCo, which is often a market trigger or an accounting
trigger CoCo, despite the fact that the major trigger mechanism is the combination
of an accounting trigger and a regulatory trigger. Some studies include a regulatory
trigger into their coverage; however, it may not be sucient to do an analysis from a
regulator's perspective. Second, continuous-time modeling is often used for the sake
of simple calculation although accounting numbers are only available at discrete time
(e.g., at the end of each quarter).
5The Squam Lake Group is a group of fteen academics who oer guidance on the reform of
nancial regulation.
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1.6 Aims of the Study
Aims of the study are to provide a model that can ll in the gap caused by the mis-
match and to answer the question that regulators might come up with: \when is the
best timing for the regulators to trigger CoCos in practice?" In this thesis, we rst
model a bank issuing CoCo with an accounting trigger and a regulatory trigger by
using a structural-default approach, and then nd an optimal capital structure for the
bank. We also model a CoCo investor with the structural-default approach and dene
regulator's problem. Finally, we look for eective regulatory policy to deal with such
CoCos, based on default probabilities of the bank and the investor.
Our contribution can be summarized into three points, all of these issues have
not been much addressed in other studies. First, we propose a comprehensive model
that includes a CoCo investor and a regulator in addition to a bank. By including an
investor into scope, risk contagion, or systemic risks, can also be examined in our model.
Second, we deal with a CoCo that has the trigger mechanism consistent with CoCos in
real markets { a combination of an accounting trigger and a regulatory trigger. Finally,
we conduct an analysis from regulator's perspective and suggest eective regulatory
policy to handle such CoCo.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 is a model description. Numerical
examples using the model are provided in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we summarize our
work and derive eective regulatory policy implicated from the numerical examples.
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Chapter 2
The Model Setup
We build a model for each stakeholder { a bank, a CoCo investor and a regulator {
respectively. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of our model. A bank model is con-
structed within the framework of a structural-default approach, following the idea of
studies such as Merton (1974) and Leland (1994). We assume that the CoCo has two
types of triggers, i.e., accounting trigger and regulatory trigger. An accounting trigger
is expressed in a rst-passage-time model, and it happens at periodic disclosure dates.
On the other hand, a regulatory trigger happens upon regulator's decision, and it is
expressed in both rst-passage-time and stochastic intensity model. A CoCo investor,
which we consider a nancial institution, is also modeled by the structural-default ap-
proach and has correlation with the bank. In addition, we assume that a regulator
solves a problem to mitigate systemic risks, i.e., default probabilities of both bank and
investor.
Figure 2.1: Model Overview
• Three	types	of	banks	(no	CoCos/conversion/write-down).
• Structural-default	approach.Bank
• First	passage	time.
• Stochastic	intensity	model.CoCo
• Structural-default	approach.
• Correlation	with	the	bank.Investor
• Solves	a	problem	to	mitigate	systemic	risks.Regulator
10
2.1 Bank
We consider three types of banks, whose assets are nanced by deposits, equity, and a
bond or a CoCo:
 Type 0 Bank issues a normal subordinated bond (no trigger mechanism).
 Type 1 Bank issues a CoCo which converts into equity when triggered.
 Type 2 Bank issues a CoCo which suers a write-down when triggered.
2.1.1 General Framework
First, we illustrate a general framework that can be applied to all three banks, following
the idea of Harding et al. (2013) who apply Leland (1994) to obtain rm value of a bank.
We assume that each bank has the same deposit-interest rate d, which is constant and
continuously paid to depositors per instantaneous time.1 Depositors are protected by
the government deposit-insurance scheme and thus the deposits are considered \default-
free." Given a xed risk-free rate r, value of the deposits D(t) (which must be equal
to the face value D) is given as
D(t) = D =
Z 1
0
e rtd dt =
d
r
: (2.1)
Similarly, face value C of the bond which pays continuous coupon c is equal to
C =
Z 1
0
e rtc dt =
c
r
: (2.2)
The bank assets V (t) follow geometric Brownian motion under the risk-neutral
measure Q, i.e.,
dV (t) = rV (t)dt+ V (t)dzQ(t) under Q; (2.3)
where V (0) = x. We also consider the process under the physical measure P as reg-
ulators are concerned with the \actual" bank-default probabilities. Suppose zP(t) =
  r

t+ zQ(t), it follows that
dV (t) = V (t)dt+ V (t)dzP(t) under P: (2.4)
As banks are subject to the capital regulation and required to maintain minimum
capital levels, it is natural to assume that their default conditions are associated with
1Leland (1994) assume that the rm nances the net cost of the debt payment by issuing additional
equity. Although this assumption is not practical, we follow Leland (1994) to keep matters analytically
tractable.
11
the capital ratio. Thus, we assume that a bank enters into resolution when its capital
ratio falls to a certain xed level D 2 [0; 1). Let Eq(t) be the value of equity disclosed
on the balance sheet, then the capital ratio is equivalent to Eq(t)=V (t).2 Therefore,
the default time D can be expressed in a rst passage time, i.e.,
D = inf

t  0; Eq(t)
V (t)
 D

: (2.5)
We assume that a bank can issue a CoCo which has an accounting trigger and
a regulatory trigger. An accounting-trigger condition can be dened similarly to the
default condition by using the capital ratio Eq(t)=V (t). If we assume a continuous-time
accounting trigger, i.e., a trigger may happen at any instantaneous time, the trigger
time denoted as  cA can be expressed as
 cA = inf

t  0; Eq(t)
V (t)
 A

; (2.6)
where A 2 (D; 1) is the trigger level. The condition A > D must be satised to
ensure going-concern loss absorption. Otherwise, the bank enters into resolution before
the trigger event to take place.
In practice, however, accounting numbers are only disclosed periodically, for in-
stance, quarterly or annually. Thus, we need to think of a discrete-time account-
ing trigger, i.e., triggers can only happen at periodic disclosure dates.3 Assume that
Tn; n 2 N is a calculation date of the capital ratio, the trigger time A is dened as
A = inf

Tn; n 2 N; Eq(Tn)
V (Tn)
 A

: (2.7)
Next, we dene a model for a regulatory trigger. The regulatory trigger happens
depending on the regulator's discretion, but of course it does not come haphazardly; a
regulator would exercise the right to trigger the CoCo when some sort of \insolvency
sign" is found. Thus, we need to think of a model that is associated with some signs in
order to express the regulatory trigger. The sign could be induced by either (1) factors
2To be precise, V (t) is the \market" asset value and it should not be equal to the \book-value" of
the assets. However, according to Buergi (2013), the book-value of assets can be approximated by its
market value when the nancial condition is severe, as accounting standards support \the conservatism
principle." Under the principle, the lower of cost or market rule is applied, thus market value is more
likely to be disclosed during the stress period.
3Banks may calculate the amount of regulatory capital more often when its nancial condition
become severe, but it may still take certain time to obtain conrmed numbers at the group consolidated
level when we consider a SIFI, who is operating globally. Thus, it is more realistic to assume the
discrete-time accounting trigger rather than the continuous one.
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other than the asset value (e.g., liquidity of assets) 4 or (2) the asset value itself.
The rst one can be modeled by applying a stochastic intensity model, following
the idea of Chung and Kwok (2015);
R1 = inf
n
t  0;
Z t
0
h(V (u))du  X
o
; (2.8)
where h is a trigger-intensity function and X is an exponentially distributed random
variable independent of the Brownian motion zQ(t). Given an appropriate function h,
the above formula makes R1 to follow a Cox process. Hereinafter, the expectation at
time t conditional on V (0) = x under the measure Q is denoted as EQx;t[] for brevity (t
could be omitted when t = 0). Under the Cox process, the probability of the trigger
to take place within some risk horizon t is given by
QfR1 < tg = Q
Z t
0
h(V (s))ds  X

= 1  EQx
h
e 
R t
0 h(V (s))ds
i
: (2.9)
Although any function that satises h(t)  0 and R1
0
h(t)dt =1 works as an intensity
function, here we suppose that h is a non-increasing function with regard to the asset
value V (t). The rationale behind this is that the factor generating the insolvency sign
should have negative correlation with the asset value. To be more specic, when the
market condition become severe, market liquidity decreases and pushes up the trigger-
intensity; at that time, the asset value V (t) is also in the decreasing phase. Thus, if we
look at the relationship between h and V (t), we can say that they should have negative
correlation.
The second regulatory trigger is modeled by the rst passage time, i.e.,
R2 = inf
n
t  0; V (t) +   VR
o
; (2.10)
where  is a Gaussian noise with 0 mean and the standard deviation being given by .
The noise indicates that regulators are monitoring the approximate asset value as the
exact amount of V (t) cannot be obtained at time t.
4OSFI (2011) announces the criteria that the OSFI (the Superintendent) may consider when they
trigger a CoCo issued by a deposit-taking institution (DTI) under its supervision. The criteria include
but not limited to:
 \Whether the assets of the DTI are, in the opinion of the Superintendent, sucient to provide
adequate protection to the DTI's depositors and creditors."
 \Whether the DTI has lost the condence of depositors or other creditors and the public. This
may be characterized by ongoing increased diculty in obtaining or rolling over short-term
funding."
 \Whether the DTI's regulatory capital has, in the opinion of the Superintendent, reached a
level, or is eroding in a manner, that may detrimentally aect its depositors and creditors."
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The second trigger dened in (2.10) is a key element in our model, because it enables
an analysis from the regulator's perspective. Although (2.8) is one reasonable way to
express a regulatory trigger, it is totally \stochastic" because X is a random variable.
On the other hand, (2.10) is considered a \controllable" trigger as it is possible to set
the level of VR in alignment with the regulator's strategies. For example, if we suppose
a relatively low V R, it indicates that the regulator is not willing to trigger the CoCo
unless the bank faces undoubtedly severe nancial condition.
Having set all the necessary triggers, the trigger time T can be obtained by
T = minfA; R1 ; R2g: (2.11)
Given the fact that even \a possibility of a trigger" had a considerable impact
on market volatilities in early 2016, we should make a presumption that \an actual
trigger" may have even larger impact. To express this, we assume that the trigger
event changes the volatility of the bank asset-value process, i.e.,
dV (t) = rV (t)dt+ V (t)dzQ(t); t 2 [0; T ); (2.12)
dV (t) = rV (t)dt+ TV (t)dz
Q(t); t 2 [T ;1): (2.13)
It is reasonable to assume that the trigger makes the asset process more volatile, i.e.,
 < T . The reason behind this assumption is as follows; as the fact, a trigger of CoCo
delivers the information that the bank has been facing a nancial diculty. Although
its capital ratio recovers by the trigger, taking into account that less historical evidence
is available to be convinced that the bank can fully turn around, it is more likely that
the trigger of CoCo weakens the bank's credibility among market participants. The
bank may suer a higher funding costs due to less credibility, and forced to do some
riskier investments to attain higher expected returns to meet the costs, which results
in larger asset volatility.
Having provided all the necessary conditions, nally we dene the total value of the
bank, denoted as v(x),
v(x) = x B(x) + F (x) + I(x); (2.14)
where B, F and I stand for bankruptcy costs, franchise value and insurance benets,
respectively. Specic expressions for each term are provided in the following subsec-
tions, as they dier according to the type of the bond issued.
2.1.2 Type 0 Bank (Subordinated Bond)
Type 0 Bank issues a normal subordinated bond, not a CoCo (thus, for the time being,
the above trigger mechanism can be ignored). Its capital structure (i.e., deposits,
the bond and equity on the credit side) does not change throughout its life. Hence,
V (t) = D + C + Eq(t) must be satised for 8t  D.
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Hence, Equation (2.5) can be rewritten as
D = inf ft  0; V (t)  VDg ; where VD =
D + C
1  D : (2.15)
When a bankruptcy occurs, the bank enters a liquidation process which obliges the
bank to pay bankruptcy costs (e.g., judicial costs). Here we assume that the bankruptcy
costs are proportionate  2 (0; 1) of the asset value at time D, thus equal to VD.
Hence, B(x) is expressed as
B(x) = VDEQx

e rD

: (2.16)
As long as the bank is solvent, the bank benets from the debt nancing (e.g., tax
benet) and we call this the franchise value. We assume that the benet is proportional
to the payment generated from the debt nancing, which is equal to d+ c. Given the
proportional factor  2 (0; 1), the franchise value F (x) become
F (x) = EQx
Z D
0
e rt(d+ c)dt

= ( D + C)
 
1  EQx

e rD

: (2.17)
The residual assets after the bankruptcy, (1 )VD, is allocated to the depositors. If
not sucient to compensate all the deposits D, the gap is refunded from the deposit-
insurance fund. Hence, the value protected by the deposit-insurance scheme equals
to
max

D   (1  )VD; 0
	
: (2.18)
In practice, it is reasonable to assume max

D   (1  )VD; 0
	 6= 0, otherwise it is
meaningless to think of a deposit-insurance scheme. Thus, under the assumption that
the value of the protection is not zero, the insurance benets I(x) become
I(x) = ( D   (1  )VD)EQx

e rD

: (2.19)
Given D dened in Equation (2.5), we can prove that
EQx

e rD

=

x
VD
 
(2.20)
where  = 2r=2. The proof is provided in Appendix A. Hence, by collecting above,
the rm value of Type 0 Bank at t = 0 can be expressed analytically as
v(x) = x+ ( D + C)
 
1 

x
VD
 !
+ ( D   VD)

x
VD
 
: (2.21)
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Next, we evaluate the market value of the bond. Recall that we are considering
a subordinated bond, the residual assets after the bankruptcy are reimbursed to de-
positors rst and then to the bond holders, if any. Thus, the value of recovery equals
to
minf C;maxf(1  )VD   D; 0gg: (2.22)
In practice, though, it is realistic to suppose that the value of recovery is usually 0. If
otherwise, it implies that there exists plenty amount of assets left at the time of default,
thus no need to put deposit-insurance scheme to practical use. With no recovery, the
value of the bond C(V (t)) is expressed as
C(V (t)) = EQx;t
Z D
t
e rsc ds

= C
 
1  EQx;t

e r(D t)

; (2.23)
which indicates from Equation (2.20) that C(V (t)) also has an analytic expression.
2.1.3 Type 1 Bank (Equity-Conversion CoCo)
We now consider Type 1 Bank, who issues an equity-conversion type CoCo. We assume
that the full amount of the CoCo converts into equity, the value of which is equal to
 C,  2 R+. Thus,  can be interpreted as a conversion ratio. For example, in the
case of  = 0:5, it indicates that the CoCo investor receives some stocks at the trigger
moment, but value of which only equals to the half of the face value of the original
CoCo.
Hence, the market value of the CoCo is given by
C(V (t)) = EQx;t
Z T
t
e rsc ds+ e rT C

= C(1  EQx;t

e r(T t)

) +  C  EQx;t

e r(T t)

: (2.24)
As shown in Figure 2.2, the capital structure of the bank changes as a result of
the trigger. Consequently, the balance sheet condition for Type 1 Bank is V (t) =
D + C + Eq(t) if t  T , and V (t) = D + Eq(t) otherwise. From (2.5) and (2.7), we
obtain
D = inf ft  0; V (t)  VDg ; where VD =
D
1  D ; (2.25)
A = inf fTn;n 2 N; V (Tn)  VAg ; where VA =
D + C
1  A : (2.26)
The bankruptcy costs and the insurance benets are the same as those of Type 0 Bank,
dened as (2.16) and (2.19), respectively. On the other hand, the amount of payment
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Figure 2.2: Capital Structure of Type 1 Bank
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generated from the debt nancing is reduced from d+ c to d after the conversion; thus
the expression for F (x) diers, i.e.,
F (x) = EQx
Z D
0
e rsd ds+
Z T
0
e rsc ds

=  D
 
1  EQx

e rD

+  C
 
1  EQx

e rT

: (2.27)
Now let's consider how we can calculate the rm value v(x) in the case of Type 1
Bank. If we assume that the CoCo only has the continuous-time accounting trigger, a
closed-form solution is available, provided that
EQx

e rT

= EQx

e r
c
A

=

x
VA
 
; t   cA; (2.28)
and
EQx

e rD

= EQx

e r
c
A
  EQx e r(D cA)
=

x
VA
  
VA
VD
 T
; t   cA (2.29)
where T = 2r=(
T )2. The proof is provided in Appendix A. The second equation in
(2.29) follows from the strong Markov property of the Brownian motion.
Unfortunately, if we consider the case of the trigger dened in (2.11), which we aim
to discuss in this thesis, the story is not as simple as above { an analytic solution is not
available. Instead, we can formulate an integral equation with regard to v(x), which is
v(x) = EQx
h
e rTv(V (T ))1fT>Tg
i
+ EQx
h
e rTvT (V (T ))1fR>T;A=Tg
i
+ EQx
h
e rRvT (V (R))1fR<Tg
i
; (2.30)
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where R = minfR1 ; R2g and vT (V (t)) is the rm value calculated under the asset-
value process after the trigger as dened in Equation (2.13).
Here we provide a narrative description on how this equation can be constructed. If
we consider only one period of time until the next capital-ratio evaluation date denoted
as T , one of the following three cases would happen:
1. The bank experiences no trigger until T , thus the bank structure is unchanged
and the rm value at T equals to v(V (T )).
2. An accounting trigger takes place at T , while regulatory triggers have not emerged.
In this case, the rm value at T is expressed as vT (V (T )) because the asset-value
process changes to (2.13).
3. A regulatory trigger happens somewhere in [0; T ), resulting in the rm-value
function to change from v to vT starting at R.
Figure 2.3 shows an image of the above description. By taking expectation and dis-
counting each of the three terms, we obtain the current rm value v(x).
The function vT (V (t)) can be obtained explicitly. Suppose that V (t) = y. It follows
that
vT (y) = y +  D
 
1 

y
VD
 T!
+ ( D   VD)

y
VD
 T
: (2.31)
It appears that the above equation is quite similar to (2.21), the rm value of Type
0 Bank. It is not surprising because Type 1 Bank after conversion and Type 0 Bank
share the same features { the asset-value process following geometric Brownian motion
(no volatility change expected in the future) and the default condition expressed in the
rst passage time (expressions of VD are dierent, though).
To solve (2.30), numerical calculation is available for some parts, yet not fully
applicable. We can use Monte-Carlo simulation to make up for the residual calculation;
however, it is not straightforward as it involves rare-event simulation. More details are
provided in Appendix B.
2.1.4 Type 2 Bank (Write-down CoCo)
Type 2 Bank issues a write-down type CoCo. At the trigger event, a fraction  2 [0; 1]
of the CoCo suers a write-down as shown in Figure 2.4. We assume that a part
of the CoCo that has not been written-down stays in its balance sheet as a normal
subordinated bond.5 Accordingly, the balance-sheet condition for Type 2 Bank is
5In practice, the issuer may redeem the part of CoCo that has not suered a write-down rather
than keeping them on its balance sheet as a normal bond. However, early redemption has the same
impact as the equity conversion in the sense that they both provide a certain xed value to the investor
at the trigger. Thus, no redemption is assumed in our model.
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Figure 2.3: Firm-Value Calculation
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V (t) = D + C + Eq(t) if t  T , and V (t) = D + (1    ) C + Eq(t) otherwise, which
derives
D = inf ft  0; V (t)  VDg ; where VD =
D + (1   ) C
1  D ; (2.32)
A = inf fTn;n 2 N; V (Tn)  VAg ; where VA =
D + C
1  A : (2.33)
The market value of the write-down type CoCo is given by
C(V (t)) = EQx;t
Z D
t
e rs(1   )c ds+
Z T
t
e rs c ds

= (1   ) C(1  EQx;t

e r(D t)

) +  C
 
1  EQx;t

e r(T t)

: (2.34)
If we consider the case of  = 0, we see that (2.34) becomes (2.23), which is not
surprising as  = 0 indicates no write-down at the trigger event thus the bond can be
considered a normal subordinated bond. On the other hand,  = 1 makes (2.34) to
be the same as (2.24) given  = 0. It implies that the write-down type CoCo takes a
middle position between the subordinated bond and the equity-conversion type CoCo.
The bankruptcy costs and the insurance benets are the same as those of the other
banks. As for the franchise value, bear in mind that the amount of debt payment has
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Figure 2.4: Capital Structure of Type 2 Bank
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changed at time T , F (x) is given as
F (x) = EQx
Z D
0
e rs(d+ (1   )c) ds+
Z T
0
e rs c ds

= ( D + (1   ) C)  1  EQx e rD+  C  1  EQx e rT  : (2.35)
2.2 CoCo Investor
If we assume that a CoCo investor is a nancial institution, the investor should also be
included in the analysis scope as regulators are concerned with its behavior to prevent
systemic risks. In the same way as banks, we apply the structural-default approach
to model a CoCo investor who possesses a certain fraction  2 [0; 1] of a bond/CoCo
issued by the bank.
Figure 2.5 shows the capital structure of the investor. As indicated, the investor
has the certain amount of the bond or CoCo issued by the bank, C(t), and the other
assets denoted as eY (t). In the case of an investor who buys the bond issued by Type
0 Bank, eY (t) follows
deY (t) = c1ft<Dgdt+ eeY (t)dt+ eeY (t)dezP(t): (2.36)
where 1A is an indicator function (equals to 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise) and ezP(t)
is a Brownian motion under the measure P, which has correlation  with z(t); thus
dzP(t)dezP(t) =  dt: (2.37)
For an investor who buys a CoCo issued by Type 1 Bank, eY (t) follows
deY (t) = c1ft<T gdt+  C1ft=T g + eeY (t)dt+ eeY (t)dezP(t): (2.38)
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Figure 2.5: Capital Structure of Investor
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Finally, the process of eY (t) for an investor having Type 2 Bank CoCo is
deY (t) = c1ft<T gdt+ (1   )c1fTt<Dgdt+ eeY (t)dt+ eeY (t)dezP(t): (2.39)
The idea here is that eY (t) basically follows a geometric Brownian motion { the last
two terms on the RHS of (2.36), (2.38) and (2.39), { and relevant income generated
from the bond or the CoCo (e.g., coupon, amount of stocks received at the conversion)
is added to the process. For example, in the case of Type 1 Bank, the rst and the
second terms on the RHS of (2.38) indicate that the investor earns coupon c until the
trigger moment and receives shares which have the value equals to  C at the trigger
moment.
Let us denote the investor's total assets by eV (t). Taking into account that the
asset side of the investor changes at the event of trigger or default of the bank, eV (t) is
equivalent to
Type 0 Bank investor: eV (t) = ( eY (t) + C(V (t)); 0  t < D;eY (t); D  t; (2.40)
Type 1 Bank investor: eV (t) = ( eY (t) + C(V (t)); 0  t < T ;eY (t); T  t; (2.41)
Type 2 Bank investor: eV (t) =
8><>:
eY (t) + C(V (t)); 0  t < T ;eY (t) + (1   )C(V (t)); T  t < D;eY (t); D  t: (2.42)
Provided that the investor is also a nancial institution, it is reasonable to assume that
its default condition is also xed by some kind of regulation; we dene the investor's
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default time eD as
eD = infft  0; eV (t)  eDg (2.43)
where eD is an exogenous constant indicating a default barrier.
2.3 Regulator
A regulator has the right to trigger a CoCo issued by the bank under its supervision.
Specic criteria on when and how the regulator determines the trigger is not made
public. However, we can dene some reasonable \mechanism" to determine the regu-
latory strategy, by paying attention to the fact that regulators act to prevent systemic
risks.
It may be possible to express the systemic risks in several ways, e.g., joint default-
probabilities of the bank and the investor. In this study, however, we put more focus
on the bank's default probability compared to the investor's. Namely, we dene the
regulator's problem as
min
VR;c
PfD < T g (2.44)
subject to PfeD < T j T < eD; T < T g < p; (2.45)
where T is a risk horizon set by the regulator. Explanations for c and p are provided
later in this chapter.
(2.45) is the investor-default probability conditional on a trigger event to happen
before default of the investor. This implies that the regulator would not allow investor-
default probability to become higher than a certain level, denoted as p. Hence, p can
be interpreted as a \breaking point" of a stable nancial system, i.e., the nancial
system is no longer resilient if the investor-default probability becomes higher than the
threshold p.
The problem indicates that regulator's main objective is to mitigate bank-default
risks, but investor's default risk is also taken into account as a constraint. To begin
with, a CoCo is invented to enhance the resilience of the bank; thus it is reasonable to
assume that the regulator triggers the CoCo if necessary to recover the bank capital.
However, we should not consider bank default risks \only" because an eventual goal
that regulators bear in mind is the resilient nancial system as a whole, which should
include CoCo investors. Thus, the regulator is also responsible for preventing investors
from suering an unendurable loss due to the CoCo.
We assume that the regulator can control the level of VR dened in (2.10). In
addition, we add another controllable parameter, which is an issuance limit c. The
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issuance limit is a regulation imposed to banks; under the limit, banks are not allowed
to issue a CoCo if its coupon c does not fall within the range of c 2 [0; c].6
6In practice, it may be dicult for regulators to directly restrict the level of coupons. However,
there exist some regulations that indirectly limits the amount of CoCo issuance. For example, a
minimum requirement for CET 1 ratio works as a restriction against CoCo issuance because CoCos
are not included in the CET 1 capital.
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Chapter 3
Numerical Example
Having dened the model setup as explained in the previous chapter, next we show
numerical examples to examine how the regulator's problem can be \solved." Note
that we are not trying to reach to the explicit solution, but rather attempt to obtain
implication on how the regulator's strategy (i.e., choice of VR and c) aects the behavior
of a bank and an investor.
The procedure for the numerical experiment is as follows: (1) nd an optimal capital
structure of a bank that maximizes its rm value, (2) evaluate default probabilities of
both bank and investor by Monte-Carlo simulation, and nally (3) examine the result
and search for eective regulatory policy to mitigate default risks.
3.1 Optimal Capital Structure
We assume that a bank determines the coupon c by maximizing its rm value. Thus,
we rst need to evaluate the rm value for each bank, and it can be done by solving
the integral equation (2.30). However, what we should bear in mind is that regulator's
strategy is always kept strictly condential, in other words, conditions with regard to
R is unknown to banks. Hence, it is unrealistic to suppose that the bank nds an
optimal capital structure under the model setup which includes the regulatory trigger.
One alternative solution is to ignore the regulatory trigger and assume T = A (a
discrete-time accounting trigger) is always the case, instead of the combination with
the regulatory trigger. However, banks know that the regulatory trigger do exists, and
it makes T to happen at any time. Accordingly, it is more acceptable to proceed
the rm value calculation with an assumption that T = 
c
A, i.e., a continuous-time
accounting trigger. In this case, the rm value can be expressed analytically, thus it is
not dicult to nd an optimal c that maximizes the rm value.
Table 3.1 shows parameters we use in our numerical example, which are chosen to
be as realistic as possible. For example, D = d=r = 70 where x = 100 indicates that
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Table 3.1: Parameters for Bank
    T r d A D   x
0.2 0.3 0.005 0.05 0.05/0.07 0.01 0.7 0.07 0 0.5 0.5 100
70% of the bank assets is nanced by deposits, which is an acceptable approximation
for Japanese Mega Banks.1
It is dicult to calibrate the asset volatility  directly from the market data, as V (t)
is not observable.2 Instead, some approximation methods are proposed as discussed in
Buergi (2013), and we use the number provided in this thesis for the level of . As
for the volatility after the trigger, T , we prepare two levels to check its impact on the
rm value.
Let c and c be an optimal coupon assuming that  = T = 0:05 and  < T =
0:07, respectively. Optimal capital structures under these parameters are shown in
Figure 3.1. It indicates that Type 1 Bank { equity-conversion CoCo { can attain the
highest rm value, followed by Type 2 Bank. In addition, we see that the increase in
T has negative eect to the rm value in both banks; in the case of T = 0:07, banks
decide to issue smaller value of CoCos compared to the other case, resulting in the
smaller rm value. As to Type 2 Bank, the rm value after the optimization under the
higher T become even smaller than that of Type 0 Bank.
Figure 3.1: Optimal Capital Structure
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1According to the disclosure reports, percentages of deposits (including certicate of deposits) are
60%, 65% and 66% for Mitsubishi UFJ FG, Sumitomo Mitsui FG and Mizuho FG, respectively, as of
September 2017.
2Zhou (2001) suggests that the asset volatility can be approximated by the stock-price volatility
in the case of low leveraged rms, however, unfortunately it is not the case for banks.
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Comparative Statics
Although it may be a digression from the main analysis, it might be interesting to do
comparative statics with regard to parameters that dene CoCo features. Having set
the basic parameters as shown in Table 3.1, we check the impact of T ; A;  , and 
on the rm value by changing one of these parameters in turns.
Figure 3.2 shows the results of the comparative statics, which can be summarized
as:
 Volatility after trigger, T , has negative impact on the rm value, i.e., the rm
value become higher if we assume lower T .
 The impact of the accounting-trigger level A is also negative, however, not to
the extent of T .
 The impact of the write-down ratio  on the rm value is positive, i.e., the rm
value become higher if we assume more write-down at the trigger.
 A conversion ratio  is independent of the rm value, as it only aects the cashow
of the CoCo investor.
 In many cases, CoCos improve the rm value compared to Type 0 Bank.
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Figure 3.2: Comparative Statics on Firm Value
Each panel shows the relationship between the coupon of CoCo (x-axis) and the rm value (y-axis).
For comparison, the result of Type 0 Bank (no CoCo) is displayed in dashed lines. As for T , we test
0.03 (volatility reduction at the trigger), 0.05 (no volatility change, base schenario) and 0.07 (volatility
hike at the trigger). In addition, we test 0.05, 0.07 (base schenario) and 0.09 for A and 0.5 (base
scenario), 0.75 and 1 for  and  .
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0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14
σT	0.03 σT	0.05 σT	0.07
(e) Impact of  (Type 2 Bank)
110
112
114
116
118
120
122
124
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14
ψ	0.5 ψ	0.75 ψ	1
(f) Impact of A (Type 2 Bank)
110
112
114
116
118
120
122
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14
χA	0.05 χA	0.07 χA	0.09
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3.2 Default Probabilities
Having determined the optimal coupon c for each bank, we are almost ready to carry
out simulation to evaluate default probabilities. A few more steps remain to be nished
before the simulation.
Parameters for Investors
As for investors, we use parameters provided in Table 3.2.3 We test three levels of
correlation  to deepen our analysis, which are  = 0:5;  = 0, and  =  0:5. If we
consider a nancial institution as a CoCo investor, the correlation should be positive.
Thus, we focus on the case of  = 0:5 and compare the result to the other cases.
Table 3.2: Parameters for Investor
e e ex eD  
0.005 0.05 100 70 0.1 -0.5/0/0.5
Parameters for Regulators: Risk Horizon and Intensity Function
We assume that the risk horizon T in (2.44) and (2.45) is set to 10 years while account-
ing numbers are calculated quarterly, i.e., Tn = 0:25n; n 2 N. Actually, \10 years" may
be a rather long-term target for regulators. For example, the Federal Reserve Board
provides a four-year scenario to conduct a stress test, so-called Comprehensive Capital
Analysis and Review (CCAR). We focus on 10-year default probabilities in our study
because our main purpose is to assess the impact of trigger in the long run, so that we
are able to analyze the subsequent behavior of the investor.
In addition to the risk horizon, we also need to nd an \appropriate" intensity
function h(V (t)) which makes R1 to follow a Cox process, as indicated in (2.8). As
mentioned earlier, among functions that satisfy h(V (t))  0 and R1
0
h(V (t))dt = 1,
we should choose the function that is non-increasing in V (t). Moreover, we should
select the function that generates R1 in a manner that is likely to happen in the real
world, i.e., frequencies of R1 and V (R1) should be well-suited to our intuition. Among
various possible functions we tested, we adopt
h(V (t)) = a
 
V  min(V (t); V )2 + b (3.1)
where a = 7:5 10 4; b = 1:5 10 4 and V = 90 as an intensity function. According
to simulation, given intensity (3.1), probabilities of the regulatory trigger to happen
3 = 0:1 is applied to the investor possessing Type 2 Bank CoCo. For Type 0 Bank and Type 1
Bank investors, we adjust the amount of  to ensure that the value of CoCo they possess at t = 0
would be exactly the same.
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Figure 3.3: Intensity Function
Panel (a) shows a graph image of function (3.1). It clearly shows that h(V (t))  b > 0, and thusR1
0
h(V (t))dt = 1 is satised. It also shows that h is a non-increasing function with regard to
V (t). Panel (b) shows the histogram of V (R) as a result of simulation (100,000 runs). Note that
R = R1 ^ R2 . Thus, it includes the frequencies of V (R2), which is induced by the controllable
valuable VR. The frequency increases as V (R) decreases, and jumps up around 80, since we have
VR  81 in this case.
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within 10 years become higher than those of the accounting trigger. It is an acceptable
result provided that the regulatory trigger could happen anytime while the accounting
trigger can occur only once in a quarter. More features with regard to the intensity
function (3.1) is provided in Figure 3.3.
Valuation of Non-Analytic Elements
Another preparation that should be done is to calculate two expectations in advance of
the main simulation, which are EQx [e rT ] and EQx [e rD ]. As shown in Equations (2.23),
(2.24) and (2.34), calculations of these two expectations are necessary to evaluate the
value of bond/CoCo, which must be known to obtain investor's asset value eV (t).
However, these expectations cannot be expressed analytically in the case of T
dened in (2.11). Hence, we carry out another round of simulation to nd explicit
functions g^T (x) and g^D(x) that satises g^T (x)  EQx [e rT ] and g^D(x)  EQx [e rD ].
Having done the simulation with regard to Type 2 Bank with c, we get
g^T (x) = e
 0:043(x VA); g^D(x) = 0:9103 e 0:061(x VA); x > VA:
Note that approximations could be dierent if we assume a dierent starting date t,
as shown in Figure 3.4. This is because the probability of A to take place at the next
calculation date is time-dependent. For instance, suppose that the next calculation
date is approaching tomorrow, and we have V (t) << VA at that time. Then it is
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Figure 3.4: Approximation by Simulation
Under the parameter set provided in Table 3.1, we obtain VA = 79:3 and VD = 71:9 for Type 2 Bank
given c. We test t = 0; t = 30 and t = 59 (days) as a starting date, and T = 60 (days) as the next
calculation date. The horizontal axes shows x VR (dierence between the initial asset value and the
regulatory threshold), where VR = (VA+VD)=2 = 76:5 is assumed. The intercept of g^T (x) is adjusted
to 1 given that EQx [e rT ]! 1 as x! VR.
(a) g^T (x)  EQx [e r
T
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(b) g^T (x)  EQx [e r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highly likely that the accounting trigger would happen tomorrow, unless we have a
dramatic increase in V (t). On the other hand, suppose that V (t) << VA but we still
have enough time until the next calculation date, then the possibility of the asset value
to exceed the accounting threshold would be higher than the former case, especially
when we have a positive drift.
As such, although we obtain slightly dierent approximations for dierent starting
dates, we conrm that the dierence does not signicantly aect the default probabil-
ities of both bank and investor. Thus, we proceed with the approximations obtained
from the result of t = 0.
The above approximations show the case of Type 2 Bank with c, i.e., T = 0:07.
We have conducted simulations with all the possible cases and successfully obtained
similar approximations.
Controllable Variables
As dened in (2.44), VR and c are supposed to be controllable variables for the regulator.
If we could test all the possible choices with respect to these variables, we may be able
to nd a \solution" to the regulator's problem. However, unfortunately, it requires
tremendous computational costs to do so. Hence, we pick up some \sample" quantities
for each variable to enable simulation and necessary analysis.
As for the regulatory threshold VR, we test three levels and name them High(H),
Middle(M) and Low(L), respectively.
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 Strategy H：VR is determined to satisfy VA < VR. It indicates that the regulator
is \aggressive," as they intend to trigger a CoCo at a relatively \early stage"
where the capital ratio is still above the accounting threshold.
 Strategy M：VR is set to meet VD << VR  VA. Under this strategy, the regu-
lator triggers a CoCo when the capital ratio falls below the accounting threshold
yet some buers remain until it hits the default barrier.
 Strategy L：VR is xed to be VR = VD + ", where " is positive but almost zero.
In this case, we may say that the regulator is \easy-going," as they wait until the
capital ratio to become quite close to the default barrier.
The most feasible strategy to be chosen by regulators would be Strategy M, because
the other strategies are impractical from the following reasons. Under Strategy H, the
accounting trigger is unworkable because the regulatory trigger is expected to happen
in advance.4 In the case of Strategy L, though loss-absorption of the CoCo enhances
the capital ratio, it may not be enough to bring the bank back to the solvency level.
It is important to include extreme cases when we want to get some implications
from just a few samples; thus, we analyze Strategy H and Strategy L although it may
be unrealistic.
As for the coupon c, we test three quantities as well:
 Case 1: c = c. It indicates that the issuance limit c is large enough to allow
a bank to choose an optimal c. The bank nds an optimal coupon with the
assumption that the trigger of CoCo has nothing to do with the asset volatility,
i.e.,  = T .
 Case 2: c = c. It also indicates that c is large enough, but a bank nds an
optimal coupon under the assumption that the trigger of CoCo generates the
volatility hike, i.e.,  < T .
 Case 3: c = c. Regulator imposes issuance limit c < minfc; cg to banks, thus
a bank can only issue a bond/CoCo that has a coupon amount upto c.
Table 3.3 summarizes the amount of c and corresponding C(x) in each case.
Scenarios
As indicated from the comparative statics, T considerably impacts the rm value,
which implies that it remarkably aects the default probability of the bank as well.
4As dened in (2.10), regulators observe V (t) + . It indicates that a regulatory trigger is induced
by the noise added process, while an accounting trigger is associated with V (t) itself. Thus, the
probability of the accounting trigger to happen under Strategy H is not zero.
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Table 3.3: Simulation Setup of c and C(x)
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
c c c
Type 0 Bank c 0.024 0.020
C(x) 2.23 1.86
Type 1 Bank c 0.137 0.096 0.020
C(x) 10.77 8.19 1.87
Type 2 Bank c 0.099 0.037 0.020
C(x) 7.95 3.29 1.81
Thus, as we have done in the previous section, we test two scenarios with regard to T
to check its impact.
 Scenario A:  = T . The trigger of CoCo does not aect the volatility of V (t).
 Scenario B:  < T . The volatility hike occurs due to the trigger of CoCo.
It is reasonable to assume Scenario B to happen in practice since the trigger of CoCo
may weaken the bank's credibility in current circumstances.
3.3 Regulatory Policy
Under the setup dened in Section 3.2, we conduct a series of simulation to evaluate
default probabilities.
Figures 3.5a and 3.5b show default probabilities of banks under measure P. We
refer to two consequences that should be worth noting.
First, if we take a look at the result of Scenario A and compare it to that of Scenario
B, we can easily nd that the default probabilities are higher in Scenario B for Type
1 Bank and Type 2 Bank, to the extent that they are even worth than that of Type 0
Bank. This is because an increase in the asset volatility (while drift remains the same)
pushes up the probability of the bank to go bankrupt. It seems trivial yet important
because it implies that the impact of possible volatility change should be taken into
account when studying a CoCo.
Second, the default probabilities of Type 2 Bank are higher in comparison to Type
1 Bank. It indicates that equity-conversion type CoCo works well to recover a bank
facing a nancial diculty. One reason behind this is the dierence in the default
threshold VD. As dened in (2.25) and (2.32), VD is higher for Type 2 Bank because
Type 2 Bank has more \debt" in its balance sheet after the trigger.
Figures 3.6a and 3.6b show conditional default probabilities of investors as dened
in (2.45). In the positive correlation case, we can see that the probabilities become
higher, i.e., CoCo investors may not have enough strength to absorb losses when CoCos
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Figure 3.5: 10-Year Default Probability of Banks
The numbers in parentheses ( ) indicate the standardized deviation. 50,000 runs of simulation are
conducted for each case.
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(b) Scenario B
!,$	 !,$	 !,$	 !,$	 !,$	 !,$	 !,$	
      
-+!-$%0	 
 
 
 
 
 

     
-+!-$%0	 
 
 
 
 
 

     
-+!-$%0	 
 
 
 
 
 

     
!,$	 !,$	 !,$	 !,$	 !,$	 !,$	 !,$	
      
-+!-$%0	 
 
 
 
 
 

     
-+!-$%0	 
 
 
 
 
 

     
-+!-$%0	 
 
 
 
 
 

     
7135264



!,$			




 0*$		!('	/+&-$#)/(

 0*$		!('  0*$		!('	")(.$+,&)(
 0*$		!('	")(.$+,&)(  0*$		!('	/+&-$#)/( 0*$		!('


!,$			




!"
!"
are triggered. The trigger event of CoCo takes place when the bank assets V (t) has
decreased to an insolvency level; positive correlation indicates that CoCo investor's
assets eV (t) is also decreasing and likely to be in a distressed level at the time of
trigger.
Next, if we compare the results of Cases 1, 2 and 3 when the positive correlation is
assumed, Case 3 (banks subject to the issuance limit) does not seem to be a desirable
choice for investors. This is because smaller c induces lower VA and VR, which makes
trigger events to happen when banks are in severe nancial condition. As noted,
investors may also be in dicult condition at that time when we assume positive
correlation.
Finally, we should also note that Strategy H seems to be a preferable choice com-
pared to the other strategies when we assume positive correlation. The reason is the
same as the earlier consequences. Strategy H makes the trigger to happen when V (t)
is still at the high level. It follows that the investor's assets is likely to be in solvent
level as well. However, Strategy H is not always the best choice if we look at the result
of banks; as it induces earlier trigger which results in the premature volatility hike.
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Figure 3.6: 10-Year Conditional Default Probability of Investors
The numbers in parentheses ( ) indicate the standardized deviation. 50,000 runs of simulation are
conducted for each case. The result of Type 0 Bank investor is not applicable since T =1.
(a) Scenario A
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(b) Scenario B
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
In our study, we contribute to build a model for CoCo issuing banks, taking into
account some important features of CoCos in real markets. First, a trigger mechanism
is supposed to be a combination of an accounting trigger and a regulatory trigger.
An accounting trigger is designed to happen periodically, while a regulatory trigger is
expected to take place anytime throughout CoCo's life, subject to regulator's discretion.
Two dierent kinds of regulatory triggers are included in our model. One is directly
associated with the bank-asset level and expressed in a rst-passage-time model. The
other is modeled by a stochastic intensity model, implying that factors other than the
asset value can also be the basis of the regulatory decision.
A CoCo investor is also included in our model to enable analysis on how CoCos
aect the investor. We suppose that the CoCo investor has correlation with the bank
and is also supervised by a nancial regulator, which is often the case in practice.
We dene regulator's problem as \mitigating systemic risks," which reects both
bank's and investor's default risks. We carry out simulation to investigate how, and to
what extent, default probabilities are inuenced by regulator's intention with regard
to when to trigger the CoCo and how to design relevant CoCo regulations. From the
result of numerical examples, we are able to make some observations with regard to
eective regulatory policy, which is summarized in the following section.
4.1 Eective Regulatory Policy
Although the numerical experiment is conducted only under the certain parameter sets,
we are able to derive some interesting consequences that are worth considering when
dealing with a regulatory-trigger CoCo.
35
Implication 1: Impact of the trigger on the asset-value process should be
taken into consideration.
The results of the numerical examples imply that an increase in the asset volatility has
an adverse eect to the bank default probabilities. Accordingly, when the volatility hike
is expected to follow the trigger, regulators should not set the regulatory threshold at
excessively high levels to avoid premature volatility hike. On the other hand, the result
implicates that \easy-going," i.e., too late trigger, may not be an eective choice to
recover the bank in a timely manner as well. That means, there may be some eective
levels with regard to the regulatory-trigger threshold that can eectively mitigate bank-
default risks.
In addition, regulators should encourage banks to be aware of the possible impact
of the trigger. When a bank does not consider the impact of CoCo on its asset-
value process, the bank may issue \too much" CoCos that may result in unintended
consequences { higher default probabilities.
Implication 2: Equity-conversion is a preferable loss-absorption mechanism
in certain cases.
As for banks, an equity-conversion type CoCo is preferable to a write-down type CoCo
as it can attain higher rm value and lower default risks at the same time. Hence,
regulators should encourage banks to issue a conversion type CoCo rather than a write-
down type CoCo. However, it should be noted that there may not be enough investors
who are willing to invest in equity-like instruments. For instance, insurance companies
may not be able to make investments in equity-conversion type CoCos because they
are often subject to exposure limits against risky stocks.
Implication 3: Financial condition of the investor should be closely moni-
tored when correlation with the issuer is positive.
Correlation between the bank and the investor is an important factor that should be
taken into consideration. If the correlation is positive, investors may not be ready to
absorb losses required to recover banks, which may result in severe systemic risks. Thus,
it is necessary for regulators to assess the nancial situation of the investor in addition
to that of banks. To enable this assessment, regulators should always be accessible
to relevant information with regard to the investor, which is not dicult if banks
and investors are supervised by the same authority. However, in some jurisdictions
such as the U.S., dierent authorities are responsible for bank supervision and investor
supervision separately. Thus, in such cases, frequent communication between these
authorities is important to eliminate systemic risks.
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Implication 4: Issuance limit is not always eective to mitigate systemic
risks.
Regulators may lay out a regulation with respect to CoCo-issuance limit if the CoCo
may induce some undesirable consequences, for instance, the volatility hike. Although
an issuance limit seems to be workable to mitigate bank-default risks, however, it is
not an eective tool to mitigate investor-default risks when the positive correlation is
assumed and the amount of CoCo issuance is associated with the trigger threshold.
Instead, one possible action for regulators to eliminate investor-default risks is to im-
pose CoCo-exposure limits, i.e., set a restriction on CoCo investments, to prevent them
from unendurable losses ex-ante.
4.2 Future Work
Although the study contributes to highlight some important features of CoCos that
impact regulatory policy, additional studies should be done to further deepen our
analysis.
Extend the Model
First, we need to extend the current model to make it even more realistic, for example,
adding a jump process.
In addition, as shown in Table 1.1, CoCos often allow earlier redemptions; thus, it
may be interesting to add a callable feature to our current model. Optimal strategies
on callable bonds are proposed in studies such as Brennan and Schwartz (1977) and
Ingersoll (1977). However, note that we are not able to follow these studies directly
because calls of CoCos are determined based on the regulator's intention, rather than
the issuer's.
Besides, we need to add a mechanism to determine the extent of the volatility hike.
We nd out that the possible volatility hike aects the bank-default risks, however, our
current model does not provide an internal mechanism to determine its extent. One
possible mechanism is to suppose that the degree of the volatility hike is determined by
the bank-asset value at the trigger moment. For instance, if trigger takes place when
the bank assets face severe reduction, then the bank experiences a considerably high
volatility increase.
Furthermore, we may be able to extend the model to incorporate larger number
of entities by studying other related elds such as network theory. It may help us
to understand more on how CoCos induce and reduce systemic risks in the nancial
system.
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Pursue More Accurate Solution
We can do another piece of work to improve our study, which relates to pursuing more
accurate solution.
We point out that it is not unreasonable to assume that an optimal capital structure
of a bank is determined under the framework of a continuous-time accounting trigger,
given that conditions with respect to regulatory triggers are not available to banks.
For this reason, in the numerical example, we have not calculated the rm value with
the model setup which includes regulatory triggers. However, we have demonstrated
how we can obtain the value by constructing the integral equation. If we are capable of
solving the equation without too much computational costs, we may be able to advance
the regulator's problem, for example, we can add another constraint to avoid regulators
selecting a strategy that excessively impairs bank's rm value.
Furthermore, we want to conduct more comparative statics to deepen our under-
standing, for example, comparative statics with regard to exposure limits on investors
and drift of the asset-value process.
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Appendix A
First Passage Time
In Equations (2.20), (2.28) and (2.29), we have shown that some analytic calculations
are available for a stopping time which is a rst passage time. In this appendix, we
provide a proof for the equations.
First, we provide a following proposition as a preparation of the proof.
Proposition A.1. (First Passage Time) Consider the process X(t) := t+ zQ(t),
where zQ(t) is a Brownian motion under the measure Q, and dene m as
m = infft  0;X(t)  mg; (A.1)
for m > 0. For some value , it follows that
EQ

e m

= e m( +
p
2+2): (A.2)
The proof of the above proposition is provided in Shreve (2003) which can be
summarized as follows.
Dene m(t) as
m(t) := eX(t) t = ez
Q(t)  1
2
2t; (A.3)
where  =    1
2
2. Therefore, m(t) is an exponential martingale under the measure
Q. Given that m is a stopping time, from the optimal stopping theorem, it follows
that em(t) := m(t ^ m) is also a martingale. Hence,
1 = em(0) = EQ[em(t)]
= EQ

eX(t^m) (t^m)

= EQ

em m1fmtg

+ EQ

eX(t) t1fm>tg

: (A.4)
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With respect to the rst term, given that the sequence fangn2N := em m1fmtng,
tn  tn+1 is non-negative and an  an+1 for 8n, we can apply the monotone convergence
theorem; thus we have
lim
n!1
EQ

em m1fmtng

= EQ
h
lim
n!1
em m1fmtng
i
= EQ

em m1fm1g

: (A.5)
As for the second term in (A.4), given that
0  eX(t) t1fm>tg  eX(t) t  em; (A.6)
we conrm that the sequence fbngn2N := eX(t) tn1fm>tng is non-negative and bounded
above. Thus, from the dominated convergence theorem, we have
lim
n!1
EQ

eX(t) tn1fm>tng

= EQ
h
lim
n!1
eX(t) tn1fm>tng
i
 EQ
h
lim
n!1
eX(t) tn
i
= 0 (A.7)
Consider the limit of equation (A.4) and collect above, we have
1 = lim
n!1
EQ[em(t)] = lim
n!1
EQ

em m1fmtg

+ lim
n!1
EQ

eX(t) t1fm>tg

= EQ

em m1fm1g

; (A.8)
which is equivalent to
EQ

e m1fm1g

= e m = e m( +
p
2+2): (A.9)
In the case of  =1, EQ e r11f=1g = 0. Hence, we obtain (A.2).
Now we prove Equation (2.20) by using the proposition. To make the following
calculation simple, dene U(t) := log V (t), so that U(t) is a Brownian motion with a
drift and we have
U(t) = y +

r   
2
2

t+ zQ(t); (A.10)
where y := U(0) = log x. Let `D be the default barrier corresponding to U(t), i.e.,
`D = log VD. It follows that
V (t)  VD () U(t)  `D () t+ zQ(t)  1

(`D   y)
where  = (r   2
2
)=. Given  = , U(t) and X(t) become equivalent and thus D
dened in (2.5) and m in (A.1) seem the same stopping time. However, note that
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1

(`D y) < 0 while (A.1) assumes m > 0; thus we need to consider the ipped process
with regard to X(t) (i.e.,  X(t)) to apply (A.2).1 Thus, substituting m =   1

(`D  y)
and then applying (A.2), we get
EQ

e D

= e
1

(`D y)( +
p
2+2): (A.11)
Substituting  = r and recalling that  =  = (r   2
2
)=, we have
EQ

e rD

= e
2r
2
(`D y): (A.12)
Finally, substituting `D = log VD and y = log x, we obtain
EQ

e rD

=

x
VD
  2r
2
: (A.13)
We can prove Equations (2.28) and (2.29) similarly.
1We can prove that (A.2) is also applicable to the ipped process  X(t) given the symmetric
feature of the Brownian motion.
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Appendix B
Calculation of Firm Value
Calculation of the rm value become complicated when we consider a combination of
dierent triggers; we need to solve an integral equation (2.30) to obtain the rm value.
Before going into details of how we can solve the equation, rst we build a similar
integral equation for a simpler case, i.e., the case of discrete-time accounting trigger
only. In the simple case, we are able to compute the rm value without simulation.
Hereinafter, a density function of a random valuable X conditional on A is denoted
as f
fXg
A (z). For example, f
fU;Mg
T (z;m) is the joint density of U(t) andM(t) conditional
on t = T .
B.1 Discrete-Time Accounting Trigger
In the combination case, T < D is assured because V (t) must pass the regulatory
threshold VR to reach VD. However, if we omit the regulatory trigger and consider
the discrete-time accounting trigger only, the probability of D < T = A becomes
non-zero quantity. Note that the default barrier in this case is bVD := ( D+ C)=(1 D)
for t < T , which is not equivalent to VD of any bank type. The threshold VD is only
applicable for T  t.
Hence, the CoCo issuing bank experiences one of the following three cases if we
consider one period of time until the next evaluation date T :
1. Neither the trigger nor the default happens.
2. No default, but the accounting trigger happens.
3. Default before or at T .
Let us denote the rm value of this simple case by v^(x) to dierentiate it from the
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original combination case. An integral equation with respect to v^(x) become
v^(x) = e rTEQx
h
v^(V (T ))1fA>Tg1fD>Tg
i
+ e rTEQx
h
v^T (V (T ))1fA=Tg1fD>Tg
i
+ EQx
h
e rD v^(bVD)1fDTgi; (B.1)
where v^T (V (t)) is the rm value after the trigger which is analytically known. From
the discussion in Chapter 2, we have
B(bVD) = bVD
I(bVD) = D   (1  )bVD
F (bVD) = 0 (B.2)
for any type of bank. It follows that
v^(bVD) = bVD  B(bVD) + F (bVD) + I(bVD) = D: (B.3)
Thus v^(bVD) is a constant value.
(B.1) is equivalent to
v^(x) = e rTEQx
h
v^(V (T ))1fV (T )>VAg1fL(T )>bVDg
i
+ e rTEQx
h
v^T (V (T ))1fbVDV (T )VAg1fL(T )>bVDg
i
+ DEQx
h
e rD1fDTg
i
; (B.4)
where L(t) := min0st V (s). Note that the event D > T is equivalent to the event
L(T ) > bVD.
Consider the process U(t) as dened in (A.10) and let `A and ^`D be the relevant
barriers corresponding to U(t), i.e., `A = log VA and ^`D = log bVD. Denote the rm value
calculated from the process U(t) as u^(y) and u^T (y), i.e., v^(x) = u^(y) and v^T (x) = u^T (y).
We have
u^(y) = e rTEQy
h
u^(U(T ))1fU(T )>`Ag1fM(T )>^`Dg
i
+ e rTEQy
h
u^T (U(T ))1f^`DU(T )`Ag1fM(T )>^`Dg
i
+ DEQy
h
e rD1fDTg
i
(B.5)
where M(t) = min0st U(s) and EQy [] := EQ[ j U(0) = y] . Given relevant density
functions, the above equation can be expressed as
u^(y) = e rT
Z 1
^`
D
Z 1
m
u^(z)f
fU;Mg
y;T (z;m)dzdm
+ e rT
Z `A
^`
D
Z `A
m
u^T (z)f
fU;Mg
y;T (z;m)dzdm+
D
Z T
0
e rDf fDgy (t)dt
=: e rT
Z 1
^`
D
Z 1
m
u^(y)f
fU;Mg
y;T (z;m)dzdm+ h^(y); (B.6)
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which can be solved numerically because density functions f
fU;Mg
y;T (z;m) and f
fDg
y (t)
have closed-form expressions, i.e.,
f
fU;Mg
y;T (z;m) =
2(z + y + (r   2=2)T   2m)
3t
p
2T
exp

 (z + y + (r   
2=2)T   2m)2
22T

;
(B.7)
for m  y; m  z (otherwise 0), and
f fDgy (t) =
(y   (r   2=2)t  ^`D)
2t
p
2t
exp
(
 (y   (r   
2=2)t  ^`D)2
22t
)
: (B.8)
(B.6) can be solved recursively. Set u^0(y) = h^(y), then dene
u^n(y) = e
 rT
Z 1
^`
D
Z 1
m
u^n 1(z)f
fU;Mg
y;T (z;m)dzdm+ h^(y): (B.9)
Note that u^n(y) is monotonically increasing in n for all y and it converges to u^(y) as
n!1.
B.1.1 Proof of (B.7)
Following Shreve (2003), from the reection principle, we have
QfM(T )  m;U(T )  zg = QfU(T )  2m  zg: (B.10)
for m  y; m  z. Since U(t) is a Brownian motion, the RHS become
QfU(T )  2m  zg = Q

y +

r   
2
2

T + zQ(T )  2m  z

= 

1

p
T
(2m  z   y  

r   
2
2

T

; (B.11)
where () is a cumulative density function of a standard Brownian motion. Hence,
(B.10) is equivalent to
Z m
 1
Z 1
z
f
fU;Mg
y;T (u;w)dudw =
Z 1

p
T
(2m z y (r 2
2
)T
 1
e 
w2
2 dw: (B.12)
Dierentiate the above by m and then by z, we obtain (B.7).
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B.1.2 Proof of (B.8)
Recall that D = infft  0;U(t)  ^`Dg, we have
f fDgy (t) =
d
dt
QfU(t)  ^`Dg = d
dt
Q

y +

r   
2
2

t+ zQ(t)  ^`D

=
d
dt
Z 1

p
T
(^`D y (r 
2
2
)T
 1
e 
z2
2 dz;
which results in equation (B.8).
B.2 Regulatory Trigger Added
Next let's consider the case of the combination trigger, i.e., T = minfA; R1 ; R2g.
Note that the event R2 > T is equivalent to the event L(t) > VR. Rewrite the
equation (2.30), we have
v(x) = e rTEQx
h
v(V (T ))1fV (T )>VAg1fL(T )>VRg1fR1>Tg
i
+ e rTEQx
h
vT (V (T ))1fVDV (T )<VAg1fL(T )>VRg1fR1>Tg
i
+ EQx
h
e rRvT (V (R))1fR<Tg
i
: (B.13)
Rewrite again with respect to the logarithmic process U(t) and its minimum M(t), we
have
u(y) = e rTEQy
h
u(U(T ))1fU(T )>`Ag1fM(T )>`Rg1fR1>Tg
i
+ e rTEQy
h
uT (U(T ))1f`DU(T )<`Ag1fM(T )>`Rg1fR1>Tg
i
+ EQy
h
e rRuT (U(R))1fRTg
i
(B.14)
where `R = log VR and v(x) = u(y).
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The rst term on the RHS of the above equation is expressed as
e rTEQy
h
u(U(T ))1fU(T )>`Ag1fM(T )>`Rg1fR1>Tg
i
= e rT
Z 1
`R
Z 1
`A
Z 1
T
u(z)f
fU;M;R1g
y;T (z;m; t)dtdzdm
= e rT
Z 1
`R
Z 1
`A
u(y)f
fU;Mg
y;T (z;m)dzdm
QfR1 > T j U(0) = y; U(T ) = z; M(T ) > `Rg
= e rT
Z 1
`R
Z 1
`A
u(y)f
fU;Mg
y;T (z;m)dzdm
 E
h
e
R T
0 h(V (s))ds j U(0) = y; U(T ) = z; M(T ) > `R
i
; (B.15)
where the last equation follows from (2.9).
The second term on the RHS of (B.14) can be expressed similarly, i.e.,
e rTEQy
h
uT (U(T ))1f`DU(T )<`Ag1fM(T )>`Rg1fR1>Tg
i
= e rT
Z `A
`R
Z `A
m
Z 1
T
uT (z)f
fU;M;R1g
y;T (z;m; t)dtdzdm
= e rT
Z 1
`R
Z `A
m
uT (z)f
fU;Mg
y;T (z;m)dzdm
 E
h
e
R T
0 h(V (s))ds j U(0) = y; U(T ) = z; M(T ) > `R
i
: (B.16)
Although the density function f
fU;Mg
y;T (z;m) is analytically known as shown in (B.7),
we need to run some simulation to evaluate these terms since the expectation part is
path dependent. Given that the initial and the terminal values are xed, we may use
techniques such as a Brownian bridge to reduce computational costs.
As for the third term on the RHS of (B.14), note that U(R2) = `R, hence
EQy
h
e rRuT (U(R))1fRTg
i
= EQy
h
e rR1uT (U(R1))1fR1Tg1fM(R1 )>`Rg
i
+ uT (`R)EQy
h
e rR21fR2Tg1fR2<R1g
i
=
Z 1
`R
Z 1
m
Z T
0
e rtf
fR1 ;U(R1 );M(R1 )g
y (t; z;m)uT (z)dtdzdm
+ uT (`R)
Z T
0
Z T
t2
e rt2f
fR1 ;R2g
y (t1; t2)dt1dt2: (B.17)
Joint probability density functions f
fR1 ;U(R1 );M(R1 )g
y (t; z;m) and f
fR1 ;R2g
y (t1; t2) need
to be evaluated by simulation, which is not straightforward as both involve assessment
of the rare-event probabilities.
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As an alternative method, if we could approximate v(x) by using v^(x), it would be
easier to obtain the rm value because we know that v^(x) can be calculated numerically.
Determine some time horizon T^ to run simulation, and then we obtain vsim(x) and
v^sim(x) by the simulation as approximations of v(x) and v^(x). Unfortunately, these
may not be good approximations given that T^ is nite, while our model assumes that
the life of a bank is perpetual unless it goes bankrupt. However, we can nd a function
g^(x) that satises
g^(x) = vsim(x)  v^sim(x); (B.18)
and then we can assume that
v(x)  v^(x) + g^(x): (B.19)
In this way, we can obtain the approximate value of v(x).
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